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Main Findings:
In Queensland, parliamentary support for water fluoridation 
is conditional on community approval. Political ambivalence 
and the constraints of the Fluoridation of Public Water 
Supplies Act (1963) Qld have hindered the advocacy of 
water fluoridation. The political circumstance surrounding 
the Lord Mayor’s Taskforce on Fluoridation Report (1997) 
influenced its findings and confirms that Australia’s 
biggest local authority, the Brisbane City Council, failed 
to authoritatively analyse water fluoridation. In 2004, a 
private member’s bill to mandate fluoridation failed in a 
spectacular fashion. In 2005, an official systems review 
of Queensland Health recommended public debate about 
water fluoridation.
Principal Conclusion:
Without mandatory legislation, widespread implementation 
of water fluoridation in Queensland is most unlikely.
Introduction:
Within the last decade, several political developments have 
focused on Queensland’s low adoption of adjusted water 
fluoridation. As a consequence, Queensland Health (QH), 
the Australian Dental Association Queensland Branch 
(ADAQ) and other professional bodies have highlighted the 
contradiction between the Government’s high expenditures 
on public dentistry and Queenslanders’ comparatively 
lower standard of oral health. This paper explains how 
Queensland’s campaigns to promote water fluoridation 
meet a mix of legislative and administrative obstacles, 
which allows continuous procrastination between the State 
Government and local authorities.  
Materials and Methods:
This review used traditional historical methods involving 
literature from ADAQ archives, journals, major provincial 
newspapers, parliamentary proceedings and official 
Queensland reports.
The QH Review:
Formal concerns about the standards of surgical 
competence at the Bundaberg Base Hospital surfaced in 
the Queensland Parliament in early 2005. Matters rapidly 
came to a head when patient complaints and media 
reports alleged malpractice within Queensland’s public 
hospital system. Queensland Premier (1998 - ) the Right 
Honourable Peter Beattie, (ALP, MLA, Brisbane Central, 
1989 - ) responded with an outsourced systematic review 
and a commission of inquiry: the Queensland Health 
Systems Review and the Queensland Public Hospitals 
Commission of Inquiry. Both had terms of reference to 
investigate the delivery of public health care within the 
health department, known as Queensland Health (QH). 
In the Queensland Health Systems Review, hereafter 
referred to as the QH Review, consultant Peter Forster 
(2005) includes issues relating to oral health. He concludes: 
“Queenslanders have the lowest standard of oral health 
in Australia”(1). Citing QH’s inability to adequately service 
public dental demand and conceding that water fluoridation 
was outside his terms of reference, Forster recommends 
“informed public debate about widespread fluoridation 
of Queensland’s water supply”(1). While Queensland’s 
fluoride advocates embraced the opportunity for debate, 
prior negative experiences carried consequences for 
Forster’s aforementioned recommendation. These require 
description but first, attention should be given to some 
background explanation.
QH’s Predicament:
QH’s Oral Health Unit faces a complex predicament. Its 
size and the demands for its services pushed QH’s 2003-
2004 oral health budget to $132 million(2). The National 
Advisory Committee on Oral Health (2004) provides 2001-
2002 public dental expenditures and staffing figures. 
Queensland tops the nation in terms of expenditure 
and staffing levels of dentists and dental assistants(3). 
The Australian Institute of Health and Welfare concurs 
by showing that 31 percent of all 2002-2003 dental 
expenditure in Queensland is from government sources(4). 
The Australian average is 17%. Successive Queensland 
Governments have established and maintained the largest 
public dental service in Australia under circumstances 
where the Federal Treasurer (1996-), Honourable Peter 
Costello (Liberal, MHR, Higgins, 1990 - ) has no intention 
of reinstating federal dental subsidy via the Commonwealth 
Dental Health Plan, which ceased in  1997(5). Queensland 
is the only state to fully replace this annual $20,000,000 
shortfall in federal assistance(6). The gravity of the 
situation is obvious. Foley (2005) cites more than 140,000 
cardholders on QH’s dental waiting lists(7). Short (2004) 
reveals annual figures of 2000 infants undergoing general 
anaesthetic for dental procedures(8). Other problems 
aggravate QH’s plight. Beattie (2005) highlights the impact 
on QH of a daily population rise of 200 people(9) and his 
Health Minister (2005 -) Honourable Stephen Robertson 
(ALP, MLA, Sunnybank, 1992 -) concedes that QH is 
struggling to attract and keep dental graduates(5). These 
issues manifest themselves as lengthy waiting lists, which 
are an enduring and politically sensitive issue that regularly 
appears in the media(10-12). Parliamentary debates and 
media reports show that Queensland politicians highlight 
gross dental expenditure, occasions of service and length 
of waiting lists as quantification of QH’s dental success(6). 
Such oratory avoids more complex issues like inability 
to access care, quality of service and standard of dental 
health in Queensland.
In spite of a Brisbane City Council’s (BCC) Lord Mayor’s 
Taskforce on Fluoridation Final Report (1997), hereafter 
referred to as the BCC Report, contrary finding for 
Brisbane’s 12-year-olds, considerable evidence confirms 
that Queenslanders have a lower standard of dental health 
when compared to other Australians(13). The National Oral 
ADAQ News April 2007         
Health Survey 1987-1988 concludes, “dental caries of the 
primary dentition was…highest in Queensland”(14). QH’s 
submission to the Lord Mayor’s Taskforce on Fluoridation 
cites Queensland’s 10 to 14-year-olds as “equal worst” in 
an Australian “tooth decay” comparison(15). Moreover, 
the Child Dental Health Survey Australia 1996 reports 
that Queensland, when compared to other states, has the 
highest level of caries experience for deciduous teeth and 
the lowest percentage of 5 to 12-year-olds with no caries 
experience(16). QH (2005) reports a lag in the decline in 
fall in mean DMFT when Queensland 12-year-olds are 
compared with their Australian equivalent from 1990 and 
2000(17). Moreover, a major newspaper editorial(18), 
ADAQ Presidents Anning(19), Foley(20) and McCray(21), 
QH(17) and Beattie(22) accept Forster’s assessment 
of Queenslanders’ comparatively lower standard of 
oral health. Dental surgeon and parliamentarian John 
Langbroek (Liberal, MLA, Surfers Paradise, 2004 - ) 
perceives the conundrum. Queensland pays “top dollar for 
Queensland children to have the worst teeth in Australia 
while a cost-effective form of prevention worth millions of 
dollars in oral heath savings goes begging”(6). Although 
not specified in his review, Forster presumably recognises 
some of these aforementioned problems by commenting 
that QH “is unlikely to remain in the situation where it 
can continue to fund free public dental health services to 
Queenslanders without increasing waiting times to the point 
where dental care is so neglected that lifetime damage is 
the consequence”(1). This literature shows that QH’s Oral 
Health Unit faces problems with recruitment, employee 
morale, escalating costs, patient access, limited federal 
assistance and optimal treatment of dental caries. However, 
Forster’s call for debate on water fluoridation has to be 
viewed within the context of Queensland experiences over 
the prior decade: most notably circumstances surrounding 
the BCC Report in 1997 and the rejection of Langbroek’s 
private members’ bill to amend the Fluoridation of Public 
Water Supplies Act (1963) Qld, hereafter called the Qld 
Act, in 2004.
The 1997 Brisbane City Council Lord Mayoral 
Election:
During the campaign for the 1997 BCC election, a mayoral 
candidate announced a policy to fluoridate Brisbane’s 
water supply. The incumbent mayor responded by 
announcing a Lord Mayor’s Taskforce on Fluoridation to 
investigate this unexpected proposal. Before analysing the 
findings of the Lord Mayor’s Taskforce, some observations 
are in order. Within the Australian municipal landscape, 
the City of Brisbane Act (1923-1924) Qld makes the BCC 
the dominant local authority in terms of size, diversity of 
legislative responsibility, budget and human resources. 
More than any other local authority in Australia, the BCC 
has the capability to authoritatively investigate fluoridation. 
Furthermore, Brisbane Water also supplies reticulated water 
to the Ipswich, Logan, Pine Rivers and Redcliffe councils 
or shires. A favourable decision could fluoridate most of 
Queensland’s southeast corner and have a potential domino 
effect across other Queensland shires and councils. The 
BCC Report was Queensland’s first public investigation 
into fluoridation and became distinctive in its failure to 
endorse fluoridation as a communal health measure for 
Brisbane(13). Given the broad, scientific endorsement 
of fluoridation, its widespread Australian adoption and 
Forster’s recommendation for communal debate, the BCC 
Report is worthy of re-examination. Attention will now be 
diverted to the political milieu surrounding both the Lord 
Mayor’s Taskforce and the BCC Report.
Lord Mayoral Candidate B Mills:
On January 27 1997, the Liberal Party (LP) Lord Mayoral 
candidate for the March 15 Brisbane City Council (BCC) 
election, Cr Bob (R) Mills announced his first major 
policy, a proposal to fluoridate Brisbane’s municipal 
water supply(23). It carried a caveat that filters would 
be supplied to “residents opposed to fluoride.” Although 
Mills had voted against fluoridation seven years earlier, 
his recapitulation was due to media reports about a 
University of Adelaide and University of North Carolina 
study that “found Brisbane children would have 65 percent 
less decay if fluoride was added”(24). While Mills publicly 
cited an unspecified “ADA investigation,” the ADAQ had 
no prior knowledge of his proposal. Events in 1996 are 
relevant, because they expose Mills’ political isolation. 
During 1996, the ADAQ had requested state policy on 
water fluoridation from the major political parties. The 
farcical nature of the reaction warrants brief explanation. 
Queensland LP Director, Jim Barron, referred the request 
to a federal colleague, who did not understand the Qld 
Act and incorrectly informed the ADAQ, “the decision to 
fluoridate water supplies is a State rather than a Federal 
responsibility” (written communication M Wooldridge to 
Thompson, 15 July 1996). In Queensland, fluoridation is a 
local authority responsibility. Archives confirm the ADAQ’s 
frustration: “messages we are getting from the (State) 
Minister and both the Coalition parties at parliamentary, 
party and committee level give us no optimism” (written 
communication I Thompson to Wooldridge, 25 July 1996). 
State Liberal vacillation again surfaced during the mayoral 
campaign, when then parliamentary leader of the LP 
(1991-1998) Deputy Premier, Treasurer and Minister for 
clinical paper
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the Arts (1996-1998), Honourable Joan Sheldon (MLA, LP, 
Landsborough, Caloundra 1990 – 2004), distanced herself 
from Mills by referring an ADAQ request for a “meeting 
regarding fluoridation” to the Minister for Health, (1996-
1998) Honourable Michael Horan (MLA, National Party, 
Toowoomba South, 1991-). Moreover, LP candidates for 
the BCC wards did not openly endorse Mills’ proposal, with 
Cr Graham Quirk stating after the election that he, “like 
most of his Liberal Party colleagues,” has an “ambivalent 
attitude to fluoridation”(25). This evidence confirms that 
Mills’ announcement had little party backing. It was a 
spontaneous decision restricted to the mayoralty campaign. 
His opponent’s reaction was both swift and astute.
BCC Lord Mayor Jim Soorley: 
In the Courier-Mail article carrying Mills’ announcement, 
Brisbane Lord Mayor, Cr Jim Soorley (ALP) refers to 
fluoridation as “mass medication,” alludes to “controversy” 
and states “doctors were divided on the benefits of 
fluoride”(23). Soorley’s enduring opposition to fluoridation 
was well-known and had been publicly reiterated two 
weeks earlier(26,27). Within twenty-four hours of Mills’ 
announcement, Soorley issued a media statement, which 
targeted Mills’ un-costed obligation to provide filters. 
Soorley refers to a purchase cost of $300 per filter, $100 
for half-yearly replacement cartridges and a three-to-one 
water wastage factor in de-fluoridating tap water. Soorley 
also highlights the potential fluoridation of adjacent local 
authorities: announces a taskforce of stakeholders to 
“weigh up” all the evidence; commits the BCC to fluoride 
supplements; and wants the “cheap politics taken out of 
the fluoride debate”(28). This media release, essentially 
a defensive strategy, was astute political jiujitsu in that it 
decentralised any decision to fluoridate and complicated 
the agenda for communal acceptance of fluoridation. 
While Soorley’s response delayed proceedings, it allowed 
for immediate public reaction, which would evolve into 
prolonged debate through the media. It also expanded 
the forum into adjacent local authorities, increased the 
number of high profile and parochial political players and 
broadened public input. In his media release, Soorley 
adopts a bipartisan stance: “I have my own views but I 
am prepared to be guided by a group who has considered 
all the issues”(28). In essence, Soorley devolved a 
divisive decision out of an electoral arena where a BCC 
commissioned telephone poll revealed “62% support for 
fluoridation in Brisbane”(29). The ALP ward candidates 
lined up behind their mayoral candidate(24). Within the 
party-political context, Mills appeared alone in his defence. 
Soorley had very quickly, shrewdly and effectively isolated 
his Lord Mayoral opponent. 
Queensland’s Minister for Health Honourable Mike 
Horan:
The State Government was also relevant, in that it further 
exposed Mills’ naivety, his political seclusion and the 
complexities of Queensland’s fluoride politics. Nine days 
prior to Mills’ announcement, Horan had publicly ruled out 
mandatory state fluoridation and sanctioned local authority 
as the domain for such decisions(30). Like Soorley’s, 
Horan’s opposition to adjusted fluoridation was both 
perennial and well known(31,32). During the BCC mayoral 
campaign, Horan instructed QH’s director-general, Dr 
Robert Stable, to initiate a legislative amendment via the 
Health Act Amendment Bill (1997) Qld to make referendum 
mandatory(33). Horan writes: “Coalition policy is extremely 
clear that mass, involuntary medication must never proceed 
without the express consent of the relevant community 
expressed by referendum.” This position was repeatedly 
stated as Government policy throughout 1997(34-36). 
Even if Mills had won the mayoral election and attempted to 
implement fluoridation, there would have been opposition 
from the ALP faction within City Hall, Horan and the 
State Coalition Government. While Mills believed that a 
successful mayoral election result provided a mandate for 
fluoridation, under the Qld Act, either the Minister for Local 
Government, the BCC or disgruntled ratepayers could call 
for a referendum. Horan’s media releases confirm that he 
also was prepared to call for a referendum, even though 
it was not the legislative responsibility for the Minister for 
Health to do so(33,37). Mills’ bid for the mayoralty was 
unsuccessful, so further extrapolation is conjectural, but 
this evidence suggests the implementation of fluoridation 
in Brisbane was always improbable. Moreover, this 1997 
standoff collaborates Forster’s view that Queensland 
has not experienced a meaningful debate on oral health. 
However, the absurdities of Queensland’s fluoride politics 
ran deeper than this.
The BCC elections and the taskforce proceedings were 
conducted over a period of political volatility for Premier 
(1996-1998) Right Honourable Robert Borbidge’s (MLA, 
Surfers Paradise, 1980 – 2003) National-Liberal Coalition 
Government. During 1997, Borbidge faced problems with 
ministerial scandals, federal legislation on gun control and 
an emerging political movement, Pauline Hanson’s One 
Nation(38). In the context of deteriorating relations between 
the Liberals and Nationals, Horan argued Mills’ proposal was 
outside acceptable State Coalition parameters. He referred 
to a National-Liberal state policy where the actual decision 
for fluoridation rested “in the hands of the people”(39). As 
stated earlier, the Liberals had no policy on fluoridation and 
the President of the National Party Australia (Queensland 
Nationals) David Russell had also informed ADAQ that the 
Coalition Dental Policy made “no mention of fluoridated 
water” (written communication D Russell to Thompson, 23 
April 1996). When the 1997 ADAQ President, M (Patrick) 
Jackman, revealed that such Coalition policy did not exist, 
Horan cryptically replied: “There is no need for a Coalition 
policy because we always felt what is in the Act is quite 
satisfactory”(34). However, the Qld Act does not mandate 
referendum for the decision, as exposed by the State 
Cabinet decision to autonomously fluoridate the township 
of Moranbah in 1971 and other Queensland fluoridations 
by local authorities at Dalby, Mareeba and Townsville(40). 
The ambivalence of the state ALP was also demonstrated 
when its shadow spokesperson on health, Wendy Edmond 
(ALP, MLA Mount Coot-tha 1989 – 2004 and Minister for 
Health 1998-2004) revealed that Labor did not have a 
policy on fluoridation(34). Clearly State Parliamentarians 
were not interested in fluoridation and arguably perceived 
Mill’s proposal as naïve.
QH:
The political milieu is important because it helps explain 
QH’s role within the Lord Mayoral Taskforce. QH’s 
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submission has to be viewed in the context of its politicised 
culture of power and control that surfaced eight years 
later in commissioner Geoffrey Davies’ Queensland 
Public Hospitals Commission of Inquiry and Forster’s QH 
review. Under Horan, QH offered no support to Mills and 
was conspicuously silent during the proceedings leading 
up to the BCC Report. QH’s subservience is obvious in 
its ambiguous submission to the BCC Taskforce where 
it “supports the optimal use of fluoride” but recommends 
neither adjusted artificial fluoridation nor its implementation. 
QH also mirrors Horan’s views by supporting “extensive 
public discussion on this issue before any decision is 
made”(15). Mills was left with only one ally, the ADAQ, 
which is an apolitical body. 
The ADAQ: 
The ADAQ’s support for water fluoridation has been public 
and ongoing and its reaction to any Queensland proposal is 
predictable. While supportive of Mill’s initiative, the ADAQ 
was not involved in its origin, timing or content. Jackman 
perceived the dilemma. He appreciated Mills’ naivety 
and political isolation but ADAQ policy was committed 
to water fluoridation. After his defeat, Mills disappeared 
from Queensland’s political landscape, and, once again, 
the ADAQ provided the infantry and $60,000 of members’ 
funds for an eight-month campaign for fluoridation across 
Queensland, which turns attention to an analysis of the 
BCC Report(35).
The Nature and Findings of the BCC Report: 
Politics were important to the BCC Report because the 
players’ positions and roles were determined by the election 
results. Soorley not only comfortably won the mayoralty but 
also controlled City Hall. The media releases announcing 
the formation of the taskforce reveal some relevant features. 
Without consultation, Soorley instituted a taskforce and 
determined its structure, chairman, membership and draft 
terms of reference. He also offered Mills the deputy-chair, 
which Mills rejected. The terms of reference were obscure 
and there were no statements of who would make decisions 
and what would be the decision process. This is absurdly 
logical because the terms of reference did not ask whether 
or not Brisbane water should be fluoridated. This was to 
be neither an independent nor detailed investigation of 
fluoridation. However additional problems soon emerged 
and further demonstrate issues associated with local 
authorities conducting fluoride debates.
During proceedings, the decision process became 
contentious(13). The methodology involved literature 
review, expert submissions and public input and as 
such, the proceedings became a forum for allegations. 
Moreover, Taskforce membership was generally a part-
time duty outside the members’ prime field of competence 
with members having restricted resources and limited time 
for comprehension of complex argument. As an additional 
strategy, Soorley independently declared a public meeting 
and set the rules for debate(41). Media reports confirm 
escalating differences between Soorley and Jackman to 
the extent that Soorley suggests Jackman “makes no more 
statements on fluoride and me until after the Task Force 
Report”(written communication J Soorley to Jackman 
6 May 1997). Clearly the machinations were becoming 
polarised and dysfunctional, as the findings reveal. 
The BCC Report has some interesting features, which 
arguably reflect the aforementioned inadequacies in 
structure and terms of reference. Most notable are the 
generic author and the references to majorities and 
minorities, which are not organisationally described and 
rarely quantified. A dissenting report is neither appended 
nor referred to(42). The conclusions are ambivalent. They 
reveal “the majority of Taskforce members would not support 
the introduction of water fluoridation to Brisbane” and their 
fundamental reservations hinge on “questions concerning 
efficacy, effectiveness and safety”(13). However, contrary 
to newspaper headlines citing “bans” and “rejection”(43-
45), the Report also concludes: “However, if the required 
data gathering and research were carried out, the Taskforce 
could be reconvened to consider new evidence”(13). 
Clearly the door for fluoridation was still slightly ajar. 
Given the resources available to BCC and the eventual 
outcome of the BCC Report, many Queensland fluoride 
advocates believe this experience underwrites Forster’s 
aforementioned observation that Queenslanders have 
not experienced a meaningful debate on oral health. The 
political constraints placed on QH over the next decade 
are also relevant.
QH 1996-2005
The administration of the Qld Act is one of perennial and 
bipartisan indifference in that the Act remained unvisited 
between 1963 and 2004. Premiers (1989-1996) Right 
Honourable Wayne Goss (MLA, ALP, Salisbury Logan, 
1983-1998) Borbidge and Beattie shared the same fluoride 
policy (36,46,47), which still exists. Horan’s 1997 instruction 
to his Director-General appears in QH’s submission to the 
BCC Report: “Whilst recognising that the balance of the 
scientific argument favours the use of fluoride in the pursuit 
of oral health, coalition policy is extremely clear in that 
mass, involuntary medication must never proceed without 
the express consent of the community(33).” Beattie (2003) 
stated the Queensland Government position and wrote 
similarly, except he substitutes “it is a principle of ethical 
public health” for Horan’s “coalition policy is extremely 
clear.” This policy has to be viewed in the context of Davies’ 
and Forster’s findings of a QH “culture” of employee 
control and centralised decision-making. Indeed, Beattie’s 
Minister for Health (2004 – 2005, resigned) Honourable 
Gordon Nuttall (ALP, MLA Sandgate, 1992 – 2006) goes 
further: “the state’s health system is racked by a culture of 
intimidation and secrecy”(48). Nuttall, as Minister for Health, 
infers that QH bureaucracy stifled his attempt to ascertain 
events within QH. However, with the administration of the 
Qld Act, the converse is true. Political control stifled QH’s 
attempt at fluoride promotion as parliamentarians and 
councillors incorrectly infer that referendum is a right in 
any decision to fluoridate. These actions have biological 
and fiscal consequences for Queenslanders’ oral health. 
Attempts at Reform:
Having said this, understated public attempts to change 
attitude to water fluoridation emerged in 2004. In October 
that year, the Director-General of QH, Dr Steven Buckland, 
launched QH’s Strategic Health Plan for 2004-2010. In the 
presence of Beattie and Nuttall, Buckland acknowledges 
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the need to address Queensland’s poor dental health record 
via water fluoridation(49), which view QH’s Oral Health 
Outcome Area Plan 2003-2006 also expressed. Moreover, 
a QH-employed dental surgeon, Michael Foley used his 
Vice-Presidency of the ADAQ to advocate vigorously for 
water fluoridation. From 2004 to 2006, Foley moved through 
ADAQ’s executive and became Queensland’s most visible 
fluoride advocate. Moreover, in 2004 and 2005, Nuttall and 
his successor (2005 - ) Honourable Stephen Robertson 
(ALP, MLA, Sunnybank ,1992 - ) also publicly supported 
fluoridation and QH openly canvassed the measure(50-
52). Whether Nuttall and Robertson’s support constituted 
a major paradigm shift in Queensland public policy is a 
moot point because their newfound political enthusiasm 
for fluoridation was conditional on community approval. 
Langbroek validated this point in September 2004, when 
he introduced a private members’ bill, the Fluoridation of 
Public Water Supplies Amendment Bill (2004) Qld, which 
would have mandated water fluoridation. It was defeated 
seventy-one votes to six with only Liberals supporting it. 
However, Forster’s QH review and its recommendation for 
debate meant that Beattie would soon return to the Qld 
Act.
The Post-Forster Political Reaction:
In a fanfare of publicity, Beattie welcomed Forster’s QH 
review by announcing “the state’s first ever mini budget 
– almost $6.4 billion in just over five years to help build 
the best public health system in Australia”(9). Fluoridation 
and oral health were not mentioned in the initial media 
releases. However, Forster’s recommendation for 
fluoride-debate was widely reported and within days, 
two major newspapers, The Australian and The Courier-
Mail editorialised favourably(18,53). While Beattie’s prior 
position on fluoridation was at best ambivalent(54,55), 
press reports declare Beattie’s “change of heart”(50) as 
he euphemistically asserts that (fluoridated) Townsville 
residents “don’t glow in the dark”(22). Beattie also issued a 
veiled threat to “take over” water and mandate fluoridation 
within five years(56,57), which statement caused a well-
publicised confrontation with the Local Government 
Association of Queensland(58). While Buckland, Foley 
and Langbroek’s attempts at policy change warrant 
acknowledgement, political control over water fluoridation 
soon re-appeared. Within a month of the release of 
Forster’s QH review, QH’s (2005) Water Fluoridation 
Questions and Answers retreats to the perennial haven 
of the Qld Act by naming local authority as the tier of 
government responsible for the decision to fluoridate(59). 
Beattie soon backed away from mandatory legislation 
by emphasising the need for community approval. He 
revisited the Qld Act with a minor amendment that satisfies 
Forster’s recommendations but did not break the legislative 
nexus between the Qld Act and the Local Government 
Acts (1993) Qld, which facilitates subsequent calls for 
referendum. This astute political reaction does not address 
Queensland’s oral health issues. In essence, Beattie, in 
accordance with the QH review, is prepared to partly fund 
capital costs for fluoridation and to allow QH to generate 
public debate, but neither parliament nor local government 
is prepared to engage the community over fluoridation nor 
prepared to make the decision to fluoridate. 
Conclusion:
The evidence confirms that any serious proposal for 
adjusted water fluoridation in Queensland will become 
paralysed with no tier of government prepared to accept 
the responsibility for a decision to fluoridate. Apart from a 
week of post-Forster rhetoric, there has been no change 
in the political environs since 1996. While the Beattie 
government has amended the Qld Act, provided some 
funding and allowed QH to propagate debate, under the 
auspices of the Qld Act, implementation of fluoridation 
within any large municipality is highly improbable.
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